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HISTORICAL BASES OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM*
JOHN P. FRANKt
When James Madison and fifty-four other gentlemen met in Philadelphia in May,
x787, they had a number of questions on their minds more important to them than
a federal judiciary. Protection of commerce against disruption by state taxes or
regulations, an end to impairment of contracts, a taxing system equal to the public
needs, an executive department-these were burning necessities to the fifty-five. Dis-
cussion in the country during the period of ratification usually found livelier topics
than courts or judges. Indeed, except for a vigorous attack on the lack of a require-
ment for a civil jury and less ardent attacks on diversity, the judiciary clauses were
almost immune from strenuous criticism or discussion.
In short, while there was in 1787 a felt need for a federal judiciary, it was not an
overwhelming need. The contract clause had its Shay's Rebellion, the prohibition
of state coinage had its state tender laws, the Senate and the House had their Great
Compromise, the prohibition on state tariffs had its history of state tariffs.2 Similarly
"Parts I and II of this essay will briefly synthesize developments which preceded the adoption of
the judiciary article of the Constitution. Part III briefly states and explores certain theories, some very
tentative, as to the origin of particular jurisdictional clauses. The origins of judicial review are outside
the scope of this article. Leading historical works on that subject are CHARLES G. HAINES, AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1932); CHARLES A. BEARDs, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONTI-
TErsO (19r2); and articles collected in 1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTUTOHAL LAW 1-174 (938).
f B.A. 1938, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. and M.A. 1940, University of Wisconsin; J.S.D. 1947,
Yale University. Member of the Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court bars. Assistant Professor
of Law, Indiana University. Professor Frank desires to express his appreciation for assistance to Mr.
Charles Gaus, Mr. Raymond Sweat, and Mr. Robert \Walsman, students in his seminar in American
Legal History.
'There were three principal sources of opposition to the judiciary portions of the Constitution: First,
the lack of a guarantee of jury trial in civil cases; second, the provision giving the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fart"; and third, the diversity provisions. Patrick Henry's
denunciation of the Constitution for its lack of a civil jury guarantee is typical of countless expressions of
that objection. 3 ELLaorr's Co NSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 544, 545 (19o), hereafter cited as ELLIOrr.
The "and Fact" objection was closely related, and was based on the assumption that the Court was
thus empowered to ignore if it chose the findings of juries. For example of this fear, see Lee, Letters
of a Federal Farmer, in PAUL L. FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 294, 308 (1888). Edmund
Pendleton, Chief Justice of the Virginia Court of Appeals, was, in the opinion of Madison and Washing-
ton, the most effective supporter of the Constitution in the Virginia convention; ROBERT L. HILLDRUP,
LIFE AND TIMEs OF EDMUND PENDLETON 280 (939). Of the "and Fact" phrase, Pendleton said,
"Though I dread no danger, I wish these words had been buried in oblivion. If they had, it would
have silenced the greatest objections against the section." 3 ELLIOTr 519. The Seventh Amendment
was intended to allay the foregoing fears. The many criticisms of diversity jurisdiction were primarily
aimed at the fear that litigants would be required to travel great distances and litigate at great expense.
See, for example, Lee in FORD, supra, at 308. Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire recommended
sharp limitations on the diversity jurisdiction. 1 ELLIOrr 322, 323, 326. Yet this discussion must be
seen in proportion. 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY (1891) discusses the adoption
of the Constitution at length and makes no appreciable mention of the judiciary. Neither does EaRNEST
W. SPAULDINO, His EXCELLENCY GEORGE CLINTON (1938), although Clinton was a leading opponent of
the Constitution in New York.
'One of the many accounts of the Constitution with analyses of these problems is in i SAMUEL E.
MORISON AND HENRY S. CORIMAOER, TIE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, CC. 12 and 13 (1942).
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the judicial system is in part the product of single definite episodes, but in part pre-
cise causes may never be found because they lie no deeper than the common sense
of the Committee on Detail of the Constitutional Convention. In this history it is
sometimes easier to find predecessors than origins.
I
THE EARLIER SYSTEMS
A. Colonial General Courts3
The thirteen colonies of course had differences in the structure of their legal
systems, but certain basic general features stand out. The colonies usually began
with a system of complete executive, legislative, and judicial power merged in a
central dominant official, as in early Virginia,4 or group, as in Massachusetts. As
pressure of business and the spread of population compelled it, the judicial business
fell into specialized hands, and local or regional courts were established. Appeals
from local courts to the governor or council or to the colonial legislature were com-
mon, with final appeal to the Privy Council.
The justice administered in colonial courts was usually as learned and frequently
as pompous as its practitioners could make it. On occasion it was more pompous
than learned. A few colonial lawyers studied in England, but only a few, and the
largest law library in New York early in the eighteenth century contained 152
volumes.1 A Maryland court in 1772, overcome with the difficulty of a problem,
referred it to those lawyers lounging about the court room for solution,8 and a
traveler in seventeenth-century Virginia noted that "a liberal supply of strong drink
often makes Justice nod and drop the scales" '9
A description of the system in Virginia suggests the commonly met problems.Y
' For a detailed study of court structure in each colony, see RoscoE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS
26-90 (1940). The most extensive study of one system is JULIUS GOEBEL AND T. R. NAUGtroN, LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1944).
" Chitwood, Justice in Colonial Virginia, in 23 JOHNS Hopxixs UNiv. STUDIES IN His. AND POL. SCI.
13 (1905).
' For an account of the Massachusetts system, see WILLIAM T. DAVIS, HISTORY oF THE JUDICIARY
OF MAssACHUSErs 1-175 (1goo). Merger of functions is a common aspect of colonial societies which
lack enough-personnel for divided government or enough business to warrant it. Simultaneously with
American development, the same phenomenon was occurring under Dutch rule in South Africa. W. P. M.
KENNEDY AND H. J. SCHLOSBERG, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF TIlE SOUT AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 5-8
(1935).
'MeMILLEN, COUNTY COURTS OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA ItI (unpublished thesis in Indiana University
Library, 1935).
7 PAUL M. HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 76 (1939). Hamlin, who has written
a very interesting description of this subject, says that 236 members of the New York bar before x8x5
had studied at the Inns of Court, most of them after the Revolution. Id. at 17, 18. Apprenticeship in an
English office cost from £200 to £300 for five years. Id. at 21 (n. 35), 33-
8 Nicholson v. Sligh, I H. & McH. (Md.) 434 (1772). On the untrained New Hampshire judges,
see PAUL S. REINSCH, ENGLISH CoEIMoN LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 27, 28 (1899).
9 MCMILLEN, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 12, quoting Colonel William Byrd.
"0 The following two paragraphs are drawn from Chitwood, supra note 4, and MCMILLEN, Op. cit.
supra, note 6; GEORGE L. CHUMBLEY, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA (1938); and WALTER B. RICHARDS,
GENESIS o THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYsaEM 15 (Address, Virginia State Bar Association (1904), pamphlet
in the Library of Congress).
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Justice was originally declared by a Council, replaced in a few years by a Governor.
The gross cruelties of administration between 16io and 16i9 by Lord de la Warr
and Governor Dale were followed by a transfer of supreme judicial power to the
Assembly, where it remained until 1682. Then the legislative judicial authority
ended, supplanted by a "General Court" consisting of the Governor and his Council,
which he appointed.
Yet from the beginning regional courts were necessary, and the "monthly court"
system was created in I624 and became the county court system in 1643. These
courts, composed usually of eight members, decided local cases by majority vote and
also had extensive administrative duties, such as making tax assessments, appointing
inspectors to receive wolf heads from the Indians for bounty, and fixing prices at
local taverns. In the eighteenth century these courts were supplemented by magis-
trate's courts of single justices to handle cases up to twenty-five shillings. Appeals
in civil cases could be taken up the scale of courts and eventually to England if
progressively larger sums of money or tobacco were involved. In addition to these
three courts, there were also courts of hustings, a court of oyer and terminer, special
slave courts, and the Court of the Commissary of the Bishop of London.1
Even so brief a sketch as this suggests certain basic features of the early colonial
court system: (I) The courts went to the people; (2) courts were part of an amal-
gamated system of government with no rigid separation of executive, legislative, and
judicial functions; (3) the accessibility of particular courts depended in civil cases
on the amount involved;"2 (4) the colonists were conditioned to a great number
of courts and an elaborate system of appeals.
B. Privy Council
The most significant aspect of Privy Council review of colonial legal problems
is that, by virtue of the Council's double jurisdiction, it merged into one body the
systems of both judicial and legislative review.' It could disapprove of statutes by
veto and could also invalidate a colonial statute in the course of deciding a case. A
foremost example was the invalidation of the Connecticut intestacy distribution
statute because it conflicted with common-law conceptions of primogeniture. 4 The
" Chitwood, supra note 4, at 70, reports that the Bishop's court had jurisdiction of' offenses by the
clergy; but this jurisdiction could not have been exclusive, for the church wardens and vestrymen pro-
ceeded in general court against a delinquent clergyman who allegedly "cared not of what religion he
was so that he got the tobacco, nor what became of the flock so that he could get the fleece." Goodwin
v. Lunan, Jeff. Va. Rep. 96, 97 (77).
"In sharp contradistinction to our present federal system, however, appeals also depended primarily
on the amount involved.
"a For discussion, see I CHsAR.LES G. HAINES, AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 44-66
(2d. ed. 1932). For extensive studies of the appellate work of the Privy Council, see Hazeltine, Appeals
from Colonial Courts to the King in Council with Especial Reference to Rhode island, ANN. REP. AM.
Hisr. Ass'N 323 (1894); Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, 28 POL. Sci. Q. 440 (913);
Kellogg, The American Colonial Charter, I ANN. REP. Am. Hisr. Ass'N 187, 267 (1903); 3 HERBERT L.
OSGOOD, AMERICAN COLONIES, I8TH CENTURY 304-307 (1924).
"'An easy-to-read account of the case is JAMES TRUsLOw ADAMS, REVOLUTIONARY NEw ENGLAND,
1691-1776 x26-130 (923).
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jurisdictional amount, set at 4300 in 1753 in particular types of cases,18 none the less
left the Council with a sizable jurisdiction.
It is the general and unchallenged opinion of scholars that the Privy Council
system is a real antecedent of the modern Supreme Court and the modern system of
judicial review. ' Jefferson desired in 1787 that the Supreme Court should be part
of a "Council" with a general veto over legislation.'7 Jefferson did not then, of
course, anticipate that his views of the judiciary would change when he knew
Marshall better, but it may surely be hazarded that he was led to his initial impulse
by his acceptance of the Privy Council system.
The Privy Council served a more important function than that of review of
legislation. It also heard border disputes between the colonies. In our own placid
acceptance of the -federal system, we are accustomed to think of state rivalries being
settled from year to year on the gridirons of state universities; but in the 1780's
unsettled border disputes would have meant war. The Privy Council settled at
least nine such disputes,'" and the removal of its service as arbiter left a void which
was filled clumsily under the Confederation and conclusively by the Constitution.
C. Admiralty
It was absolutely imperative that the problems normally decided by admiralty
courts be decided by someone, and admiralty courts were among the first estab-
lished in the colonies.' 9 Admiralty courts had begun in England in the fourteenth
century, and as early as 136o Sir John Beauchamp was given authority to try
pirates,20 a problem thereafter existing in both hemispheres.2 The first admiralty
court in North America was established in Newfoundland in 1615 when Sir Richard
Whitbourne was given authority as admiral to punish Sabbath breaking, fouling the
fairways, and burning forests ashore. The first case in Massachusetts occurred in
i63o when Thomas Moulton, pilot, chose between flogging and a forty-shilling fine
for deserting his ship at Plymouth.
In the seventeenth century a system of vice-admiralty courts, dominated by the
colonial governors, spread through the colonies. They had then and retained later
two primary types of jurisdiction: (i) ordinary marine cases, including wages and
i;I LEONARD W. LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRuCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, No. 453, 325-327,
and see 329 (935).
"
8 See, for example, JAmES B. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS I, 3 (xgo8); I HOr.ER C. HocKirTr, THE CoN-
sTIrUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEs 155 (1939).
"'Letter, Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, IV Doc. HISTORY OF THE CONS'TTuTION 411
(Dep't State 1905), cited hereafter as Doc. Hisr.
1"Discussed briefly in I HoC:KErr, op. cit. stpra, note 16, at 155, and in Sargeant's essay in Dupou-
CEAU, JURISDICTION 141 (1824).
10 Two leading studies of colonial admiralty courts are Charles McL. Andrews, Vice Admiralty Courts
in the Colonies, in DOROTHY S. TOWLE, RECORDS OF THE VICE ADMIRALTY COURT OF RHODE ISLAND,
1716-1752 1-79 (1936); and HELEN CRUMP, COLONIAL ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THlE 17Tr
CENTuRY, ROYAL EM.PIRE SOCIAL STUDY No. 5 (London, 1931). Other authorities are collected in
Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133, 137, n. i, and 144, n. 6 (1943).
"The references in this paragraph are taken from CRUMtP, op. Cit. supra, note 19, c. I.
"For documents on piracy, see JoHN F. JAMESON, PRIVATEERING AND PIRACY IN TIE COLONIAL PERIOD
(923). Pages 190-257, e.g., contain the papers in the case of Captain Kidd.
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salvage; and (2) prize cases.2 2  However, in the latter portion of the seventeenth
century Britain began to enforce her navigation and trade acts against the colonies,
a step which led directly to reorganization of the admiralty courts.
In England, forfeitures for violation of revenue or navigation laws were heard
not in admiralty, but in Exchequer. Experience in the colonies proved that juries
would not convict their fellow colonials in trade cases, 3 and in 1697 the admiralty
courts were reorganized to utilize their non-jury procedures in the colonies to enforce
the acts of trade. The gubernatorial control was eliminated, and the vice-admiralty
courts became Crown courts with added trade jurisdiction.24
The result was the emergence of a new type of admiralty court in the colonies
from which appeals lay first to the High Court of Admiralty2 5 and, near the end
of the colonial period, to the Privy Council. 6  Developments in these new courts
were not uniform, but they were trending in a distinctly non-English direction, a
historical fact to which the Supreme Court has recently failed to give sufficient
weight.
7
The admiralty system retained a qualified popularity in the colonies depite the
extreme dissatisfaction with the utilization of those courts for trade control. Efforts
made in colonial times to establish juries in admiralty were blocked by the Privy
Council,2" but several of the states during the Revolution did add juries. The real
dissatisfaction with admiralty courts, however, was apparently with the law they
enforced rather than their procedure, for the attempt to engraft a jury system did not
survive the Constitution. 9
D. The Confederation
The Revolution eliminated those two essential portions of the American legal
system which were dependent wholly on England: the Privy Council disposition of
cases between states, and the vice-admiralty courts. The latter, particularly in war-
time, required a substitute.
The Revolution began under the aegis of the Continental Congress, which was
legally no more than a conclave of ambassadors of independent states. One of the
"These are discussed extensively in ANDREWS, op. cit. supra, note 19, at 24-59.
"Id. at 74.
"For discussion in addition to ANDREWS, see x H. L. CARSON, HISToRy OF TE SUPREmE COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 27-38 (1905), hereafter referred to as CARSON.
" Thus the High Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction over a class of appeals coming from the
Colonies which it could not have heard in cases arising in England. The Vrouw Dorothea (1754),
reported in The Fabius, 2 C. Rob. 245, 165 Eng. Rep. 304 (1800).
" ANDREWS, op. cit. supra, note 19, at 22.
"Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133 (1943), holding that a state court had jurisdiction to con-
demn a fish net used in violation of state law. It had theretofore been thought that all maritime causes
of action in rem must be brought in admiralty.
" ANDREWS, Op. Cit. supra, note 59, at 9, 0.
"0 See §9, Judiciary Act, i789, 1 STAT. 77. It would be interesting to know exactly why juries
were considered so unsuitable for admiralty. The Governor of Providence Island (off Nicaragua) recorded
in his diary that he stopped jury trials in admiralty there in 1638 because "thes Jurors proved them-
selves soe absurde and ignorant as sone made me finde the miserie of trialls in these dayes .... " JAMEsoN,
op. cit. swpra, note 21, at 8.
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first tasks of these representatives was the creation of a form of government, and the
Articles of Confederation were agreed to in Congress in November, 1777, though
they were not ratified until 1781.
In establishing a judicial system, the draftsmen of the articles had no North
American precedents. The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of
New England in 1643 had contained a commissioner system which could only by
a stretch be called "judicial," 0 and Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan of 1754 had no
judicial provisions at all.3' Yet the Confederators had a void to fill.
They wrote into the articles three basic provisions for dealing with judicial
problems. The Confederacy was to have authority to punish piracy, quickly dele-
gated to state officials in practice.32  A court was established to hear appeals in
admiralty cases, and an almost incredibly clumsy system for arbitrating interstate
border disputes was created which was actually utilized in three cases and which
averted real war between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the Wyoming lands 33
The principal national judicial system during the Revolution was in admiralty,
an oft-told story. In a word, as American vessels began to take prizes, General
Washington found himself seriously distracted from military duties by pleas that
he dispose of the booty. In November, 1775, he asked Congress to take steps to have
such cases decided, and it immediately called upon the states to create their own
admiralty courts with appeals to Congress. The states did so, and appeal cases were
heard first by the Congress, later by a standing committee, and finally by the Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture, the first American national court, which functioned
in anticipation of and under the Confederation.s4
This admiralty system was of vital significance in the conduct of the war because
it was used to permit both privateers and national vessels to cash out their prizes
quickly. Congress established prize agents throughout the colonies to condemn
enemy ships in admiralty courts, and occasionally a captain invading an area where
'
0 For discussion of the United Colonies, see CHArLa M. ANDREWS, COLONIAL SELP-GoVERNmENT
r652-x689, C. 3 (1904). Article 8 authorized the Commissioners to consult "about free and speedy
passage of justice in each jurisdiction to all the confederates equally, ..." FRANCIS BOwEN, DOCUMrENTS
OF ThE CoNsTrToN OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 83 (1854); and see also Article 6, id. at 82.
"
1The Plan contemplated a Grand Council to govern, inter alia, Indian trade and treaties. BOWEN,
op. cit. supra, note 30, at 87. For William Penn's plan for union, see BRECKINRiOGE LONG, GENESIS OV
THE CONsTruTIoN 113-1x6 (x926).
"Article IX granted authority for "appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies," a function
delegated to the states by the Confederation Congress. 19 JoUR. CONT. CONG. 354 (1912).
"Article IX provided that for border disputes Congress was to create a panel of thirty-nine, from
which the parties would strike alternately until thirteen were left, from which the panel should be drawn
by lot. Professor Jameson has shown that this system was modeled after the English Election Act of
1770. In England the process of selection was known as "knocking out the brains of the committee"
because each side sought to eliminate the ablest supporters of the adversary. Jameson, The Predecessor
of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY I (1889). The border dispute cases,
including the Wyoming dispute in which Connecticut enlisted the military aid of the neighboring Green
Mountain Boys, are described by Jameson at page 3, and by CARSON, op. cit. supra, note 24, at 66-79.
Each case is described in 131 U. S., App. x-lxii (1888).
'' The leading study on this subject is Professor Jameson's essay, supra note 33. See also CARsoN,
op. cit. supra, note 24, cc. 4, 5-
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prize agents were unavailable was told to "employ some suitable attorney to libell
for" his prizes.33
The system worked, but it worked poorly. The Court of Appeals and its pred-
ecessors did hear io9 cases. 6  Occasionally state courts decided in favor of state
interests and then refused to comply with a congressional reversal.37  Even more
serious, privateers anxious to make profitable captures might seize neutral ships, and
an over-zealous capture of two Spanish vessels, brought to a Massachusetts court
which would not subject itself to federal review, very nearly cost the colonies the
friendship of that important neutral!' The experience of the Confederation con-
vinced virtually every conscientious patriot of the 178o's that the admiralty jurisdic-
tion ought to be totally, effectively, and completely in the hands of the national
government, and an extended search has not revealed a criticism from any contempo-
rary source of the clause of the constitution granting federal admiralty jurisdiction. 9
II
TBE INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS
The Constitutional Convention had to decide whether to establish a govern-
mental system fairly clearly divided into basic legislative, executive, and judicial
departments or whether to continue the frequent colonial device of amalgamation.
The oft-heard theory that the Fathers read Montesquieu, thereby misunderstood the
British constitution, and as a result created the tripartite system of government, seems
most unlikely.40 Madison, for example, had systematically studied the governments
of the world from earliest times in anticipation of the Convention, and knew per-
fectly well what he was talking about.4' The evidence is that on the merits the
" This system is fully documented in OuT-LETrERs OF THE CONTINENTAL MARINE COMMITTEE AND
BOARD ras ADMIRALTY, 1776-1780 (Paullin ed. 19r4), and the quotation is taken from letter to Captain
John Barry, Jan. 29, 1778, Vol. 1, 198, 199.
, 131 U. S., App. xxxv-xlix, lists the cases.
m For details see Penhallow v. Doane, 3 DalU. 54 (U. S. 1795) and United States v. Judge Peters,
5 Cranch 1x5 (U. S. 18o9).
38 24 JoUR. COT. CONG. 227, 386 (1922). For account of the Massachusetts practice, see CLAUDE
H. VAN TYNE, AmEuICAN REVOLUTION 190-192 (1905).
'
9 Privateering was a business, and the businessmen became thoroughly dissatisfied with disorderly
handling of admiralty cases early in the war. In 1779 sixty-eight of the leading citizens of Philadelphia,
including Robert Morris, James Wilson, and Thomas Fitzsimons, who were all to be delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, petitioned for a permanent court of admiralty with fixed judges, saying,
"In the privateering trade in particular, the very life of which consists in the adventurers receiving
the rewards of their Success and Bravery as soon as the Cruize is over, the least delay is uncommonly
destructive." Jameson, The Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL HIsToRY
24, 26 (x889).
'"For statements approaching this, see JostN Fst, THE CRiTIcAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HisroitY
291 (x888); and Sir Henry Maine, in POPULAR GOVERNMENT, says, ". . . neither the institution of a
Supreme Court, nor the entire structure of the Constitution of the United States, were the least likely
to occur to anybody's mind before the publication of the Esprit des Lois." Quoted and discussed in
C. ELLIS STEVENS, SouRCEs OF THE CoNssTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES I85, x86 (1894).
"
1 Even though Federalist Paper XLVII makes him look as though he didn't, in respect to Mon-
tesquieu. For a critique of the Montesquieu theory, see Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powpers
in Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. Os PA. L. REV. 842 (1938). For example of Madison's
extensive preparatory analysis before the Convention, see his elaborate memorandum, recopied by Wash-
ington for his own use, on contemporary and ancient governments. IV Doc. Hisr. 138.
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Convention preferred divided authority and that Montesquieu was a good source of
rationalization; but the choice when made was defended on the basis of colonial
experience, and even so, complete separation was not the prime purpose.4
This is apparent in the history of the judiciary. The original Randolph plan
provided for "one or more supreme tribunals" and a system of lower courts; but the
judges were to be chosen by the legislative rather than the executive branch, and "a
convenient number" of them were to participate with the Executive in a "council of
revision" to veto acts of Congress. The courts were also to try impeachments.4
The disputes of the members of the Convention concerning the judiciary turned
on a few questions: Should the judiciary try impeachments (a question not of inter-
est here); how should judges be chosen, how compensated, and how long should
they serve; and should there be any lower federal courts? It was accepted without
question that there should be a Supreme Court.
The Randolph proposal provided for lower federal courts, and this general
principle was tentatively adopted on June 4, 1787, with no substantial discussion.44
But there was strong sentiment in the Convention to leave all litigation at the trial
stage to the state courts, a principle of the competing Paterson plan,45 and on June
5 Rutledge of South Carolina moved reconsideration of the original decision by
which the lower courts had been accepted. To him and to Sherman of Connecticut,
appellate review by the Supreme Court was enough to protect the federal interests,
and Sherman added that duplicate federal trial courts were too expensive4
Madison opposed reconsideration, arguing that the volume of appeals would
be unmanageable and that biased jury verdicts or biased trial court directions would
escape any effective appellate review.
Rutledge and Sherman carried conviction to the delegates, and a motion to elimi-
nate lower federal courts carried, five to four, with two states divided. Thereupon
Madison and Wilson saw and took the opportunity for seeming compromise which
eventually gave them all. The defeated Randolph proposal had required that lower
courts be established; Madison and Wilson moved to give Congress the option to
establish lower courts. The difference was enough to double the vote for lower
courts, and the new resolution was fixed in the Constitution by a vote of eight to
two.
The method of appointing judges was similarly the product of compromise. A
move for exclusive executive appointment, countered by a move for exclusive legis-
lative selection, resulted in compromise on the Massachusetts system of executive
selection with the advice and consent of the Senate1 7 Thus the large states, which
saw benefit in purely executive appointment, and the small states, which would have
42 See Madison's discussion of the state practice in this regard in Federalist Paper XLVII.
4i8 MAX FARRJAND, THE REconDs OF THE FEDEEAL CONNENTION 20, 21 (1937).
"Id. at 104, 105.
"Id. at 244.
c The discussion of the reconsideration may be found in id. at 124-125.
"'For discussion, see 2 FtaRANr 41-44.
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disproportionate representation in the Senate, each had a portion of their way.t8
Eventual agreement on Article III involved adjustments throughout the article.
As a convenience of discussion, the delegates talked about types of courts, methods
of appointment or compensation, and jurisdiction separately. Yet they obviously
interact. A man's judgment as to structure may be affected by his concept of juris-
diction. The process of the Constitutional Convention brought a review of histori-
cal practice, a compromise of conflicting interests and political necessities, and the
creation of a genuinely new type of judicial organization.49
III
THE ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction posed as many problems as the system itself. For this, too, Randolph
and Paterson had answers. The original Randolph plan, which envisioned lower
courts, gave jurisdiction which may be summarized as jurisdiction in admiralty, in
cases between citizens of different states or foreigners, in cases of federal revenue,
in cases of impeachment, and as to "questions which may involve the national peace
and harmony. 5 ° The Paterson plan, assuming appellate jurisdiction only, deleted
the diversity jurisdiction in cases of citizens of different states and the "national
peace" clause, and added specific reference to treaty cases and federal trade regula-
tion cases.51 The Convention tentatively gave jurisdiction in revenue, impeachment,
and national peace cases and sent the clause to the Committee on Detail to work
out the remainder.52
The work of that Committee must be seen in relation to the basic general
purposes of the Constitution. Those purposes need not be reviewed. Suffice it
to say that they included the establishment of a government which could keep
RxcwdAs, op. cit. supra note io, at 23.
""The establishment of the lower court system was the "transcendent achievement" of the judiciary
Act of 1789. FaLux FRANKFURTER AND JAMES M. LANDIS, TH BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 4
(1927). After the adoption of the Constitution, the judiciary system was given two major examinations,
once in connection with proposed Constitutional amendments, and once in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The history of the Act is told in Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Hitv. L. Rav. 49 (1923). The principal question to be decided was whether the Congress
would take up the option given it to establish lower courts. The Senate attitudes are discussed by
Warren at 65-69, and the House attitudes at 123 et seq. The Senate debate is unrecorded, and the
House debate, though extensive, offers substantially nothing which would illumine the pre-1787 conditions
leading to Article III other than the basic sentiment that state courts were untrustworthy, particularly in
federal question cases. Warren, 124. The other problem was that of amendments to the Constitution
itself. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments did affect judicial procedures, but Madison's
proposal to avoid "vexatious appeals" by requiring a minimum amount for appeals to the United States
Supreme Court was lost. See Madison to Pendleton, Sept. 14 and 23, 1789, V Doc. HIST. 205, 210;
Warren, 1x8-.t9. In the letter of September 23, Madison reported that others felt that amount was no
measure of importance, particularly in constitutional cases. Madison was probably able to accept an
opposite point of view because of familiarity with the system of appeals in Virginia and to the Privy
Council, described above.
50FAutA&, op. cit. supra, note 43.
1 bid.
"The principal references in the Madison journal are I FARRAND 223, 224, 230, 231, 244, 317;
2 id. at 41-46, 129 et seq.
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domestic and international peace and which would give full protection to the
property and business interests which for various reasons felt 'much in need of it.
It was clearly contemplated that the judges were to be conservative and sound men
of property. That most of the delegates at Philadelphia were such men is old
knowledge." They were businessmen and landholders and the lawyers of busi-
nessmen and landholders, and they conceived of like men, or indeed of themselves,"
as judges under the new system. A good share of the judicial business necessarily
would concern property interests, and jurisdictional clauses must be considered ac-
cordingly.
For convenience of analysis, the nine federal jurisdictional clauses may be viewed,
with some overlapping, from three standpoints: (i) an effective national govern-
ment; (2) international obligations; and (3) the interests of property.
A. An Effective National Government
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity" arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States... ; to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States."
These are the most important jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution from
the standpoint of the basic political maintenance of the government. Without them,
or some substitute for them-indeed, without any one of them-it may fairly be
doubted whether the government could have survived. So much cannot be said of
any other jurisdictional clause, with the possible exception of the treaty provision.
For the purpose of this analysis, the "federal question" and "United States party"
clauses may be considered together. The basic weakness of the Confederation had
been its inability to make and enforce those demands which are the proper preroga-
tives of government. Article I gave the new Congress power to make demands.
Article III gave a method of enforcing them.
The Confederation had no means of participating in either civil or criminal
litigation except on the sufferance of the states. The state courts had to settle federal
military accounts; 6 only the state courts could punish such offenses as treason;"'
"' The leading analysis from this standpoint is of course CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTER-
PRETA 7O OF THE CONs rON, c. 5, 73-151 (1935 ed.).
"'On September 28, 1789, President Washington appointed delegates Wilson, Blair, and Rudedge
to the Supreme Court, delegate Bedford to the district court for Delaware, and delegate Read as
United States Attorney in Delaware. For Wilson's remarkable application for the Chief Justiceship
("My aim rises to the important office of Chief Justice of the United States"), see x CIARLES WARREN,
THE SuPREmE COURT IN UNTED STATES HISTORY 33, 34 (x926 ed.).
"The inclusion of equity in this fashion is attributed to Connecticut delegate William Samuel
Johnson, who had grown attached to that practice in England. GEORGE C. GROCE, WILLIAM SAMUEL
JOHNsON 165-167 (1937). It was criticized by the "Federal Farmer" for permitting merger of law
and equity powers in one judge, ". . . for if the law restrain him, he has only to step into his shoes of
equity and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate." PAUL L. FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE
CoNsTsrurOrN 308 (1888).
"For discussion of some of these problems, see Sargeant's Essay in DupoNcEAU, JuRIsDIcroN (1824);
x CARsoN, op. cit. supra, note 24, c. 7; 22 JOUR. CONT. CoNG. 83, 102 (1914); 23 M. at 773.
" See the numerous treason cases in i Dallas. For extensive discussion of the treatment of treason
in the Revolution, see Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HAnv. L. REV. 226, 246-272 (1944).
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only the state courts could punish theft of federal property or frauds on the govern-
ment."' The Confederation could merely appoint its attorneys to go into state
courts.5 9
The sponsors of the Constitution deeply believed that no government could exist
without power to enforce its requisitions and its laws.6 ° These clauses reflect that
conviction.
As for suits between states, no more need be said. From the earliest times to
1787, except for the short period of 1775 to 1781, there had been a method of settling
interstate disputes. The jurisdiction formerly in the Privy Council and then in the
arbitral commissions of the Confederation was transferred to the new Supreme
Court.0 1
B. International Affairs
"... to all Cases ... arising under ... Treaties . . . ; to all cases affecting Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."
The Confederation had found itself powerless to conduct the international affairs
of the states. 2  It could make agreements, but it could not enforce them. It could
not even extend to foreign nations an assurance of protection of their representatives
in America. The treaty with Great Britain, particularly in respect to debts payable
to British merchants or creditors, was being ignored;13 and the case of de Long-
champs had great potential of national embarrassment.
The Chevalier de Longchamps had a standing grudge against Francis Barbe
Marbois, French consul-general at Philadelphia. Epithets at the consulate were
followed by blows on the street, and though the French official had the best of the
battle, further punishment for de Longchamps was in order. He was prosecuted in
Pennsylvania courts and heavily-almost preposterously heavily-sentenced, doubt-
less more as a menace to relations with France than as a threat to the peace. 4
"' See for examples Respublica v. Sweers, a Dall. 41 (U. S. 1779) (deputy Commissary-General
charged with fraud in connection with army stores); Respublica v. Powell, i Dall. 47 (U. S. 1780) (army
baker charged with short weighting).
i" As in the Sweers case, cited supra, note 58.
60 Citations would be merely cumulative. The basic social evil to be remedied, as Washington ex-
pressed it in a gloomy letter to Madison before the Convention, March 31, x787, was put thus: "I con-
fess, however, that my opinion of public virtue is so far changed that I have my doubts, whether any
system without the means of Coercion in the Sovereign will enforce due obedience to the Ordinances of a
general Government without which everything else fails." IV Doc. Hi-r. 1o.
Z The threat of interstate war and past devices are considered by Hamilton in Federalist Paper LXXX.
'
5 The judiciary is discussed from the standpoint of maintenance of international peace in Federalist
Paper LXXX.
"'Wilson discussed the ill consequences of the non-enforcement of the British treaty in the Pennsyl-
vania convention. 2 ELLir 489, 490.
' Respublica v. De Longchamps, i Dall. i i (U. S. 1784). The defendant was heavily fined,
sentenced to imprisonment for two years, and put on bond in addition. The discussion at 115, 116
shows that France wanted an even more severe penalty. The case is suggestive of the manner in which
the United States has on occasion made a small nation eat crow for failing to give adequate protection
to an official. Cf. the Iranian incident, 18 Ams. J. INT'L L. 768 (1924).
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None the less, suppose Pennsylvania had not prosecuted. The foreign relations of
every state were at the mercy of the one state in which an incident occurred. The
Convention was convinced that if foreign officials were either to seek justice at law
or be subjected to its penalties, it should be at the hand of the national government.
The Supreme Court proceeded immediately to enforce the British treaty,"5 and the
lower courts heard numerous cases like that of de Longchamps.6
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction had a double purpose, both inter-
national and economic. Admiralty cases might involve the relations of the United
States with foreign countries, and the same basic conviction which gave national
jurisdiction in respect to treaties and ambassadors required it here. The lines be-
tween piracy and privateering were thin, and yet the difference might affect war and
peace; and the seizure of the two Spanish ships during the Revolution taught a
strong lesson. There were few to contest the argument of James Wilson that ad-
miralty jurisdiction must be wholly national since "it related to cases not within
the jurisdiction of particular states, and to a scene in which controversies with
foreigners would be most likely to happen.""
C. Property and Trade
"... to all Cases... arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States
and Treaties made, or which shall be made ... ; between a State and Citizens of
another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."
The Constitution, said Hamilton while its ratification was pending, had "the
good will of the commercial interest throughout the states which will give all its
efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating, protecting, and
extending the commerce of the Union ... the good will of most men of property in
the several states who wish a government of the Union able to protect them against
domestic violence and the depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on
property. " s - Article III was a part of a unified program calculated to enlist the
support of "most men of property."
For this purpose the most obvious clause was that giving jurisdiction in federal-
question cases. The three central prohibitions of the Constitution from a standpoint
of contemporary economic interest were the prohibitions on state impairment of
"'Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalI. 599 (U. S. 1796).
"' United States v. Liddle, 2 Wash. 205 (C. C. Pa. i8o8); United States v. Hand, id. at 435 (s8ro),
This is not to say that the foreign-minister clause was essential to the taking of jurisdiction in cases
like that of de Longchamps, since these would become federal questions without that clause under Art.
, §8, cl. so (offenses against the law of nations). This is none the less suggestive of the general kind
of trouble the delegates had in mind. A typical example of a sort of problem in foreign relations which
belongs in federal court, in this case in admiralty, is The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116
(U. S. 1812).
GI FARRAND 124.
"IV Doc. His-r. 288 (1787).
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contracts, state currency, and state tariffs." If a state should violate these prohibitions
the courts were to invalidate the violating statutes.70 In addition, Congress could
regulate commerce, and impinging state regulations could be invalidated by juris-
diction granted under the phrase "constitution or laws."
The treaty jurisdiction was an important element of the Constitution viewed
either from the standpoint of international affairs or of economic matters. The
basic power to make treaties gave rise to fears, notably in Kentucky, that treaties
inimical to regional economic interests would be made and enforced.7 In addition,
the phrase giving jurisdiction in cases arising from "Treaties made, or which shall be
made" torpedoed the hopes of those who desired to avoid the payment of British
debts, secured under the Treaty of 1783.7" Madison said, "The articles relating to
Treaties-to paper money, and to contracts, created more enemies than all the errors
in the System positive and negative put together."'
The remaining clauses can be viewed from many standpoints, and this sketch
will deal with three: (I) What was the relation of real property interests to the
judicial article? (2) What was the basic purpose of the diversity jurisdiction? and
(3) Measured by the use actually made of the federal courts in the period immedi-
ately after their creation, what conclusions, if any, can be drawn about the purposes
of Article III? For such illumination as it may shed on the othei two questions,
the third will be considered first.
x. The federal courts, r79o-r85
A statistical analysis of the actual operations of the federal courts, even in their
infancy, is far from being a fool-proof means of determining their purpose. The
Founding Fathers may have made mistakes of judgment about what would prove
important, and the growth of the country itself materially affected the business of
the courts.
None the less, performance is at least some measure of purpose. It permits the
statement of some working hypotheses which, tested against others, may indicate
fruitful lines for analysis. For this limited purpose, the following data is offered.
Table i gives a jurisdictional and functional analysis for 434 cases reported in the
Supreme Court in the years i79o-r815. The sources of the cases and the problems
and weaknesses of classification are discussed in the appended note.
CD These three basic prohibitions are discussed together by Madison in Federalist Paper XLIV.
50 Discussed by Hamilton in Federalist Paper LXXVIII, in which he analyzes the judiciary as "an
essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society."
"' The argument skillfully made to the delegates from Kentucky at the Virginia convention was that
the southern states would never willingly give up the navigation of the Mississippi to the Spanish, while
the northern states were indifferent to it. Under the Confederation, southern votes could block such a
move, but under the Constitution the southern states might be outvoted. See, for a few of many
examples of this discussion, the remarks of Henry at 3 ELLiOTT 15, 152; Lee, id. at 182; Grayson, id.
at 501, 505.
72x ALBar J. BEvEuIxaE, LiFE OF JOHN M Hs-a.L 441, 444 (igi6).
" Madison to Jefferson, October 17, 1788, V Doc. Hxsr. 85, 86.
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TABLE i
BusiN&ss OF THE SuPREM COURT, 179o-i81574
JU5ISDIcrlOti 1790-1800 1801-1810 1811-1815 Total
Original ................................. 8 1 0 9
Diversity ................................ 18 71 46 135
Admiralty ............................... 16 22 46 84
U.S. Civil ............................... 3 17 12 32
U.S. Criminal ............................ 1 3 2 6
Appeals, state courts ...................... 3 7 7 17
District of Columbia ...................... 0 79 41 120
Miscellaneous ............................ 7 21 3 31
Total ............................. 434
ECONOMIc BASE
Credit (bills, notes, bonds, etc.) ............. 9. 30 15 54
Contracts for goods and services ............ 2 13 6 21
Contracts relating to land (sales, rents,
mortgages) ............................ 4 23 26 53
Controversies relating to public land grants.. 4 12 9 25
Insurance ................................ 0 23 16 39
Maritime
Prize or salvage ........................ 15 26 47 88
Contract (excluding insurance) ........... 1 3 2 6
Collisions ............................. 0 0 0 0
Estates ................................. 1 10 4 15
Slaves .................................. 0 6 2 8
Torts ................................... 0 1 0 1
U.S. Civil ............................... 3 21 15 39
U.S. Criminal ............................ 1 5 2 8
Miscellaneous or unclear ................... 16 48 13 77
Total ......... . . . .. 434
TabTe 2 gives a similar analysis of 647 cases reported in
in the same period. 5
the federal circuit courts
On the basis of these tables and the underlying study, certain conclusions may
be stated:
x. Quantity of cases is not in itself a highly significant measure of constitutional
purpose. Else one would be forced to believe that a primary purpose in creating
"' This table omits those cases reported so briefly that, without the record, not even an intelligent
guess can be made as to either jurisdiction or interest. The miscellaneous category includes the few
patent cases. The seventy-seven "miscellaneous or unclear" cases in the economic table include
sixty-eight cases in which the report is too short to permit a guess at the interest.
Credit cases have been put as a separate category from sales, contracts, and mortgages for two
reasons: (a) many of the reports reveal that the suit was on a note, but not what the note secured;
(2) in the early economy, with shortage of money and in the absence of corporate stocks and bonds,
notes were used as a medium of exchange or for speculation. Hence they represent a separable interest.
For a good example of a wandering note, see Steinmetz v. Currie, a Dall. 269 (Pa. 1788). The
economic table attempts to reach the fundamental interest without regard to form. For example, there
are more cases involving government civil interests or maritime interests than actually arise jurisdictionally
in that form.
"
5The comments in the preceding note are applicable here. These cases were taken from the
following reports: 2-4 Dallas; Brunner; Wallace Sr.; x-3 Washington; a Brockenborough; a Peters
(circuit); a Paine; 1-2 Gallison.
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TABLE 2
BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS, 179o-i815
JURISDICTION 1790-1800 1801-1810 1811-1815 Total
Diversity ................................ 23 212 133 368
Admiralty ............................... 1 23 104 128
U.S. Civil ............................... 2 10 37 49
U.S. Criminal ............................ 14 23 28 65
M iscellaneous ............................ 3 19 15 37
Total ............................ 647
EcoNomc BASE
Credit (bills, notes, bonds, etc.) ............ 7 45 23 75
Contracts for goods and services ............ 1 29 14 44
Contracts relating to land (sales, rents,
mortgages) ............................ 7 43 46 96
Controversies relating to public land grants.. 1  7  1  9Insurance ............................... 2 50 16 68
Maritime
Prize or salvage ........................ 2 17 87 106
Contract (excluding insurance) ........... 0 22 21 43
Collision .............................. 0 1 0 1
Estates ................................. 0 3 11 14
Slaves .................................. 0 2 2 4
Torts ................................... 2 4 4 10
U.S. Civil ............................... 2 12 38 52
U.S. Criminal ............................ 14 23 28 65
Miscellaneous or unclear .................. 5 29 26 60
Total ............................. 
.. 647
the Supreme Court was to furnish a tribunal for the settlement of cases arising in the
District of Columbia.
2. There was, quantitatively, very little immediate need for a Supreme Court in
1787 or for some years thereafter.
3. Many of the large number of District of Columbia cases could have been
diversity cases had they arisen elsewhere. Such factors as physical distance probably
discouraged the institution of cases in other federal trial courts and certainly dis-
couraged appeals from other federal courts.
4. The number of serious and important federal questions actually considered in
the Supreme Court was minute. United States civil and criminal cases were few
and, for the most part, trifling. The number of appeals from state courts which
could raise serious federal questions was only seventeen in twenty-five years, and
while important public questions arose from other sources, they were rare.76
5. At the beginning of the period, the principal economic groups involved in
litigation, quantitatively at least, were the shipping industry, the holders of bills
and notes, and those who dealt in land. However, a new industry, insurance, was
on the horizon, and by 1815 furnished an important part of federal work. The
" For examples, Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803), original; Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87 (U. S. 18xo), diversity.
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shipping problems were primarily prize and salvage, although before the end of
the period contract cases were appearing; and most of the insurance cases were ship
insurance problems. Throughout the period, however, and particularly at the be-
ginning, the international aspects of admiralty were the most important in litigation.
Tort cases in diversity were almost nonexistent, as were problems of banks or corpo-
rations.
6. In the lower courts the business originated predominantly in diversity and
admiralty. Excluding the District of Columbia cases, the principal differences
between the two levels of courts in this period were that the lower courts had a
somewhat higher proportion of Government business and had received more mari-
time contract problems other than insurance.
7. The whole federal judicial system from 179o to 1815 gave almost its entire
attention to the settlement of the simplest types of commercial and property dis-
putes. It was, in addition, enforcing some federal statutes, particularly those relating
to the shipping embargo and the War of 1812. Over half of the small business of
the federal courts could have been handled substantially as well in state tribunals.
2. Land titles
Assuming that historians need no longer re-contest the ground which Dr. Charles
A. Beard has already won, we may start with a fixed assumption that economic
events have a great deal to do with political and constitutional developments. That
being so, the relation of land speculation to the Constitution and to the Judiciary
Article presents a puzzling problem on which only the most tentative observations
can be made at the present stage of research. Yet despite lack of tangible evidence,
it would surpass belief that this portion of the Constitution could have been written
without consideration of land speculating interests.
In 1787 there were fortunes to be made in buying land cheaply from state or fed-
eral governments, bringing in settlers from the East or from Europe, and selling at a
good profit. Prior to the Revolution there were ten principal land companies in
the colonies, the two best known in our own age being the Ohio Company of 1748,
in which George Washington was an active participant, and the Transylvania proj-
ect, remembered principally because its promoter, Richard Henderson, bought
20,000 acres in Kentucky from the Cherokees at three cents an acre and sent Daniel
Boone on his way to legend by making him the explorer of the area.
77
These concerns knew how to manipulate governments. Frequently they had to.
7 s
17 There has been extensive publication on the land companies. However, a number of writers have
become preoccupied with the scandals, and obscured the facts. The leading general work on land
policy is BENJAmIN H. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1924), and a good special-
ized work on this period which analyzes separately each of the ten companies referred to is SHAW
LiVrBmoRE, EARLY AmERcIAv LAND COMPANIES 74-132 (938). Land sales under the Confederation are
discussed sedately in PAYsoN J. TREAT, TIE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM,, 1785-1820 4-66 (tgio), and
considerably less sedately in AARON M. SAKOLSmI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE 1-123 (x932);
ALFRED M. CHANDLER, LAND TITLE ORIGINS 72 et Seq. (1945).
" It is principally to the Ohio Company of Associates, which desired to obtain and sell land in
Ohio, that credit should go for the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established a government for
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Administrative officials were cut in when necessary to win official approval 0 These
were big operations, carried on by men of imagination and power. After the Revo-
lution it was no longer necessary for the speculators to deal with a distant England,
and they turned their whole attention to the state, Confederation, and national
governments.
Within a few years -of the Revolution ten more great land companies were form-
ed."o Among those interested were many of the principal figures of the Constitution-
al Convention. The largest of all was Robert Morris of Penhsylvania, who in 1791
owned, among other land interests, 5,30oo0o acres in western New York and who
may well have been the biggest real estate speculator of all time.81 Both Morris
and his lawyer, James Wilson, were strong Federalist delegates to the Convention
from Philadelphia, and Wilson, one of Washington's first appointees to the Supreme
Court, was active in the formulation of the judicial portions of the Constitution.
Other delegates active in land speculation were Washington and Mason of Vir-
ginia, Blount of South Carolina, Carroll of Maryland, Dayton of New Jersey, Fitz-
simons and Franklin of Pennsylvania, and at least five others82
Not only were the speculators, or persons interested in speculation, participants
in the Convention, but they were in various other ways close to Convention mem-
bers. One of Washington's principal non-convention advisers, for example, and his
first Secretary of War, was General Henry Knox of New York, who in 1791 was one
of a group which bought two million acres in Maine at ten cents an acreYs  The
Reverend Manasseh Cutler, preacher, botanist, and businessman, was at the very
moment of the Philadelphia Convention engaged before the Confederation Congress
in New York in wangling a iY -million-acre grant for his Ohio Company of Associ".
ates. Cutler was compelled to take 3Y/ million acres more than he wanted, to be
divided among persons of influence, in order to get his own grant of II million84
While working on his great project in New York he came to Philadelphia and had
an extended and congenial visit, including an outing in the country, with Convention
delegates Madison, Hamilton, Mason, and Rutledge, among others8 5 He eventually
went back to Massachusetts and supported ratification there.
that area. For one of many discussions, see CHARLES A. BEARD, THE RisE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZAT[Os
510-513 (935 ed.). The problem is briefly mentioned in FRED RODELL, FIFTY-FIVE MrEN 18 (1936).
" See, for example, the participation of Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, in the affairs of the
Indiana Company, LrvEomoRE, op. cit. supra, note 77, at xo8.
"
0 Each is described in id. at 133-214.
"
1 ELLIS P. OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MoRRIs, PATRIOT AND F5NANCIER (1903). On the New York
speculations, see SAxoLsvi, op. dr. supra, note 77, c. 3.
"2 List taken from CQARLEs A. BEARD, EcoNoMIc INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITTIrroN, c. 5, and
particularly x5i. (r935 ed.)
" LivEntoomE, op. cit. supra, note 77, at 174-177. For an extended- statement by Knox to Washing-
ton of the former's pre-Convention views, see letter, Jan. 4, 1787, IV Doc. Hisr. 58.
" For a crisp account of the incident see CsiARLEs A. BEARD, THE RISE OF AmERIcAN CiviLszAOTxo
(1935 ed.). For a leisurely account, the Cutler Diary is fascinating reading. i LIFE, JouRNALs AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D. X19-373 (W. Parker and Julia P. Cutler, eds., IS888).
81 Cutler Diary, supra, note 84, July 14, 1787, at 271-279.
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Several of the jurisdictional clauses were of actual practical significance to large
landholders. The most obvious relevant clause was that granting jurisdiction in con-
troversies "between Citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of differ-
ent states," a clause that at least possibly could affect every eastern speculator who
held land in Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, or Maine-areas soon likely to become new
states and to have some notions of their own as to who should own the lands within
their borders8 6
However, the diversity and treaty clauses were the jurisdictional clauses most
immediately affecting large landed interests. The wording of the treaty clause de-
termined who should own several hundred thousand acres in the Northern Neck
of Virginia; and the diversity clause permitted speculators holding land under state
grants to litigate questions of tide in federal courts which, it must be remembered,
were to be part of a government friendly to "men of property."
The implications of the Constitution for land-holding interests received com-
paratively little recorded public discussion in the course of ratification of the Consti-
tution. A local appeal to New Hampshire based on the "grants of different states"
clause is a rare instance of public attention." In Virginia, however, the ratifying
convention did discuss the clauses in relation to the two specific land interests of
that state, the Fairfax estate and the Indiana Company. A word must be said as to
each.
Lord Fairfax, Washington's friend and neighbor, held title before the Revolution
to some 3oooo acres in that northeastern sector of Virginia south of the Potomac
known as the Northern Neck. Virginia confiscated interests in these with other
royalist lands and parceled some of them out again. Among others, George Mason
had a substantial interest in them after the re-shuffling. Mason was one of Virginia's
wealthiest men and had been a delegate at Philadelphia but refused to sign the
Constitution. With Patrick Henry, he led the opposition in Virginia."" The treaty
of peace in 1783 promised a return of the confiscated property. The one chance of
the Fairfax heirs was that a federal judiciary might enforce that treaty.
Whether the Indiana Company took an active part in the Virginia convention has
" This clause seems to have originated in the efforts of Vermont to secure independence from both
New Hampshire and New York. Sharp controversies followed Vermont's "declaration of independence"
from its neighbors on January 15, 1777, and in 1779, as a result of border controversies, Congress re-
quested the states involved- to permit it to resblve disputes arising out of land grants from the different
states. For details see 131 U. S., App. i-liii.
" Agrippa (James Winthrop), in PAUL L. FORD, EssAYs oN THE CONSTsTUTION 75 (1892).
" See HELEN D. HILL, GaORrE MASON (1938), passim, and on his opposition to the Constitution,
213-238. A rather remarkable theory of the reason for the divergence of the Virginia political leaders
on the Constitution is offered in an earnestly anti-Constitutional study, Grigsby, The History of the
Virginia Federal Convention, 9 VA. Hist. Soc. COLLEC. 42, n. 48 (x89o): Washington, Pendleton, Wythe,
and Madison were the strongest supporters of the Constitution. If one looks to unconscious guiding
factors "it may be said that they were all men of wealth, or held office by a life tenure, and that,
though married, neither of them ever had a child. In the same spirit it may be mentioned that Mason
and Henry were men of large families,.and that hundreds now living look back to 'Gunston Hall' or 'Red
Hill. In the case of Henry, the cradle began to rock in his house in his eighteenth year, and was
rocking at his death in his sixty-third."
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not been traced, but it had probably the largest immediate stake in the adoption
of the Constitution of any business enterprise existing in 1787. In 1768, after the
most elaborate negotiations, the Indiana Company "bought" from the Indians of
the Six Nations 3 million acres of land in what is now West Virginia. Between
1776 and 1779 the issue of title was fought out with Virginia. Mason lkd the
opposition and Edmund Randolph represented the company before the Virginia
assembly in those years. Mason prevailed and the company seemed lost. Mean-
while many Virginians settled in the claimed area.!9
Mason's attack on the judiciary sections at the Virginia convention was specific
and candid. He could not vote for the Constitution so long as the judiciary clause
stood as it was. He reminded his listeners that his own pecuniary interests de-
manded the non-enforcement of the Treaty of 1783. If it were ever enforced, he
conceded, his own interests in the Fairfax land would be adversely affected ° In
addition, he argued, the Constitution would give the Indiana Company an oppor-
tunity to reassert its claim before the federal courts, and therefore the residents of
the area involved should oppose the Constitution if they did not want to pay tithes
to the Indiana Company.9 1 He proposed an amendment that the federal judicial
power should apply only to such causes of action arising after the adoption of the
Constitution. 2
Marshall and Randolph, among others, answered that Mason's fears were ground-
less because the federal judiciary would respect the Virginia determination on the
Indiana Company; and that if the Fairfax heirs were entitled to the land, they
should have it 9
Mason's predictions were shrewd. Within a few years Marshall became counsel
for the Fairfax interests, and eventually, financed by Robert Morris, a Marshall
syndicate bought the property. 4 The Supreme Court upheld the Fairfax-Marshall
title 5 The Indiana Company did sue Virginia in the United States Supreme Court,
which took jurisdiction?' Thereupon Virginia and Georgia, concerned because of
go For an extended account of these affairs see GEORGE E. LFwis, THE INDIANA COIMPA,,Y, 5763-
1798 (1941). Failing in Virginia, the company appealed to the Confederation Congress, hiring Thomas
Paine as its propagandist for 300 shares. Paine wrote a pamphlet in support of the company entitled
"Public Good." These latter incidents are described in MERRtILL JEzsEN, THE ARTrIC.Es OF CONFEDERA-
*rION 121 et seq., 218, 233 (1940).
go "I am personally endangered as an inhabitant of the Northern Neck. The people of that part will
be obliged, by the operation of this power, to pay the quitrent of their lands. Whatever other gentlemen
may think, I consider this as a most serious alarm." 3 ELLIOTr 528.9
'
1 d. at 529.
:' Id. at 530.
31 d. at 559, 574. Beveridge notes that Marshall himself "was then personally interested in the
Fairfax title," and adds, "His own and his father's lands in Fauquier County were derived through
the Fairfax title." I BEVERI GE, op. ct. supra, note 72, at 448. Randolph, formerly counsel for the
Indiana Company, assured the delegates that in the future "the remedy will not be sought against the
settlers, but [against] the state of Virgina." 3 ELLOr 574.
",The transaction is described in 2 BEVERIDGE, Op. ct. supra, note 72, at 199-2ai.
' Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U. S. 1813); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I
Wheat. 304 (U. S. 18x6).
" Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320 (U. S. 1796).
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Chisholm v. Georgia, allied in writing the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity into the Constitution, and the Indiana Company's claims were finally
dismissed.
7
As Tables i and 2 show, there is record of nine cases in the lower court reports
and twenty-five in the Supreme Court involving interests in public lands between
i79o and 1815. Most of these were small affairs, quarrels over soldiers' bounty land,
for example. But some were important. The Fairfax estate case, arising as a federal
question based on the treaty clause, has been mentioned. Fletcher v. Peck, a
feigned case brought in diversity to settle the title to the Yazoo lands in Georgia, is
well known. Another was Fitzsimons v. Ogden, 9 in which, in an extremely com-
plicated situation, Gouverneur Morris, a delegate at Philadelphia, emerged trium-
phant with the stupendous remnant of Robert Morris' fallen estate. The case arose
in diversity and involved no federal question. The Court found that G. Morris had
been "unkind" but not fraudulent to the R. Morris interests.
Other land company cases were Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass,"° a case which
may also have been carefully arranged to put it into diversity. The issue was
whether the Holland Company, purchaser of hundreds of thousands of acres from
Pennsylvania, should lose tide for failure to give full compliance with its contract.
Marshall's language in deciding this non-federal question is revealing of the Court's
essential spirit of friendliness to the land companies °0 In Pendleton and Webb
v. Wambersie,"' the Court in kindly fashion lent federal jurisdiction to untangling
the affairs of a land company which had stretched its shoe string beyond the break-
ing point, and in Town of Pawlet v. Clark113 it gave full-and logical-scope to the
clause concerning grants from two states.
This much of a hypothesis is offered for further exploration: A large commercial
interest in the country and in the Convention in 1787 was that of the existing or
immediately impending land companies. The judiciary article was specifically dis-
cussed in terms of land speculations at least in Virginia. The Supreme Court aided
virtually every land speculator who came before it from i79o to x815,104 and the
federal jurisdictional clauses and particularly the diversity clause gave most material
assistance for that purpose. In all probability the drafters at Philadelphia, or at
least some of them, had some such benefits in mind as one of the factors influencing
their drafting of Article III.
3. The diversity jurisdiction
The most obvious explanation of the two clauses in Article III giving jurisdiction
°"Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (U. S. 1798). For an analysis of this litigation, and the
steps taken by Virginia, see LEwis, op. cit. supra, note 89, at 277-291.
*" 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 181o). g7 Cranch 2 (U. S. 182).
1003 Cranch i (U. S. x8o5). 1 0"1d, at 7o-71.
1024 Cranch 73 (U. S. 1807). 103 9 Cranch 292 (U. S. i81.5).
10' Except for George Mason. Had he lived, his cup of misery would have run over when he lost
sitle to 83oo acres of land in Kentucky on the ground of improprieties in his survey.: Wilson v. Richard
Mason, devisee of George Mason, x Cranch 45 (U. S. xos).
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in private cases in which one party is not a citizen of the state in which the suit is
brought is the explanation most often given: the drafters of the Constitution thought
either that justice or the important appearance of justice would be denied if such
cases were left to state decision. So Marshall early declared. °'0
But the brilliant article by Mr. Friendly in 1928"'° and the forceful statement by
then Professor Frankfurter,"°7 based in part on the Friendly researches, casts grave
doubts on the accuracy of the obvious. Their publications and the firm response of
Professor Yntema and Mr. Jaffin leave the reason for diversity a matter of sharp
disagreement.108
The Friendly-Frankfurter position in rough summary may be put thus: An
examination of available records, particularly decisions of state appellate courts
before 1787, does not show any record of bias of state courts in favor of their own.
The records and debates at Philadelphia and in the states show no evidence of a con-
viction that such bias existed, for not one speaker made a clear statement to that
effect. Those debates do show that support for diversity jurisdiction, even among
its friends such as Wilson and Marshall, was "tepid," and that it was based essenti-
ally not on fears of regional bias but on fears of class bias: e.g., that in a vague but
real sense the drafters of Article III thought that the federal courts would counter-
balance the spirit of paper money and debt relief in state legislatures.0 9 Actual
local hostility, says Friendly, "had only a speculative existence in 1789.''11°
To this Yntema and Jaffin say, essentially, "Unproved." There are too few re-
corded cases to measure actual hostility, they say;"' and the absence of discussion in
1787 and 1788 may mean merely that it was impolitic and unnecessary to attack
state judges." 2 From the records they extract phrases which indicate there was
actual hostility."' However, the essential bulwark of this position-which, it must
be emphasized, they do not contend they have proved-is that it is incredible
"'°The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U. S. 18o9). For fuller statement of
this view, see JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TnE CONSTITUTION.f 629 et seq. (1833).
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (19-8).
107Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORN.
L. Q. 499 (1928).
10. Yntema and Jaflin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869
(1931).
' "The available records disclose no particular grievance against state tribunals for discrimination
against litigants from without. The real fear was of state legislatures, not of state courts." Frankfurter,
supra note 107, at 520.
110 Friendly, supra note ao6, at 5io.
... Yntema, supra note lo8, at 876, n. 13.
"2 d. at 875, n. 13. If, for example, the hypothesis advanced earlier of relation of land interests
to the judiciary is sound, it is easy to believe that in 1787 as at some other times politicians were not
talking about all the subjects they were thinking about. Madison wrote Hamilton as follows during the
Virginia consideration of the judiciary: "The attacks on it [the judiciary] have apparently made less
impression than was feared. But they may be secretly felt by particular interests that would not make
the acknowledgment, and wd. chuse to ground their vote agst. the Constitution on other motives."
Letter, June 22, 1788, IV Doc. Hisr. 745.
"'Yntema, supra note 1o8, at 876, n. 13.
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that in the narrow, provincial, petty spirit of inter-colonial relations, there should
not have been local bias in the administration of justice' 1 4
Both positions carry persuasion despite apparent conflict. On the one hand it is
incredible that the colonies should have administered justice with complete fairness
to each other. On the other hand, it is true that there was very little concrete evi-
dence of hostility in specific lawsuits. The evidence does show that in 1787 bias in
interstate lawsuits was more an anticipated than an existing evil.
The explanation of the paradox of inevitable bias and yet no bias lies in the
character of pre-1787 litigation. In the first place, there is some record of actual bias,
intra-empire if not interstate. There can be no doubt, for example, of direct bias
in the administration of justice against British creditors in Virginia. There in 1770
the jurisdiction of the Court of Hustings at Williamsburg, in which creditors had
previously proceeded, was sharply constricted for the purpose of putting creditors
at the mercy of county courts which could be relied upon to make debt collection
difficultY"0  The purpose was contemporaneously so understood.'10  Similarly at
least two of the state judgments in admiralty cases between 1777 and 1786 were
probably products of bias in favor of state interests." 7
And yet the problem was not an acute one in 1787 for reasons going to the
nature of the domestic economy of the colonies and states. There was too little signif-
icant interstate business litigation to give room for serious actual abrasion.
Table .3 analyzes 554 reported cases in seven colonies and states from 1658 to
1787. These are substantially all available reported cases." s The table cannot be
accurate, for in too many cases one can at best make a good guess as to whether a
case was of local or diverse origin. Many doubts were decided in favor of listing
the case in diversity.
These data and the underlying cases indicate that the volume and certainly the
proportion of interstate commercial litigation were extremely low. This is indicated
by several factors: (i) A higher proportion of diversity than of local cases must have
been appealed or come into the reports, because such cases would have to be of at
The conviction that "the theory of no local prejudice is presumptively improbable" is stated and
documented in Yntema, supra note 1o8, at 876, n. X3.
..8 Henning (Va. Stat.) 401, 402.
226 John Tazewell, Williamsburg attorney, wrote his client, John Norton, English merchant, on July
22, 1770: "If this Law is not disallowed, Creditors for the recovery of their Debts must either bring
their Suits in the General or County Courts where Years must elapse before an unjust or unwilling
debtor can be brought to Justice." Quoted in GEORGE L. CHUMBLEY, COLONIAL JusTMCE IN VIRGINIA
148, 150 (938), as part of a general discussion of this subject. English agents charged the purpose of
the change of jurisdiction was to make debt collection difficult, and Chumbley concludes, "An unbiased
study of the matter indicates that they were right in their conclusions." Id. at 148.
...For details see Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54 (U. S. r795), and United States v. Judge Peters,
5 Cranch 115 (U. S. 18O9).
... These cases are taken from Kirby and the Acorn Club Kirby Supplement of 1933 (Conn.); I
Harris & McHenry (Md.); Quincy (Mass.); i Martin (N. C.); I and 2 Dallas (Pa.); i Bay (S. C.);
Jefferson and 4 Call (Va.). It cannot be too strongly emphasized that these records are in such form
that the listings are very nearly guesswork. A large number of cases on which not even a guess could
be made are omitted.
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL AND DIVERsITY CASE S, COLONIAL AND
STATE COURTS, 1658-1787 (SCATTERED REPORTS)
STATE LOCAL ORIGIN DIVERSE OPGIN
Connecticut ...................... 192 26
M aryland ........................ 136 6
Massachusetts .................... 67 2
North Carolina ................... 4 1
Pennsylvania ..................... 74 13
South Carolina .................... 28 6
Virginia .......................... 38 1
539 90.74% 55 9.26%
least some importance to be worth bringing in the first place. It is probably safe
to assume that if from these sources we find 9.26 per cent of the cases in diversity,
the actual proportion was far lower. (z) Many of these cases were not interstate
cases, but English-state cases. In the six Maryland diversity cases, for example, four
probably involved English interests." 9  (3) Of the American cases remaining after
the English cases are eliminated, few involved commercial problems. The credit
cases were with England. In South Carolina, for example, one of the diversity cases
involved a drunken brawl and another involved slave stealing. 20
To understand the judiciary of 1787, one must of course understand the country,
and the country was growing and changing so quickly that the commercial America
of i8oo was substantially different from the commercial America of 1780. When the
Constitution was drafted the underlying economic developments which we assume
when we speak of diversity jurisdiction today had barely begun to exist. First, there
was substantial interstate and intercolonial trade in the period before i78o, but both
in volume and in dollar value it was less significant than the West Indian trade or
the European trade.' 21 Second, the intercolonial trade was predominantly of a very
" Hyde & Co. v. Bradford's Ex., I H. & McH. 82 (Md. 1730); Brent's Lessee v. Tasker, id. at 89
(1737); Black v. Digges's Ex., id. at 153 (1744); Burk v. M'Clain, id. at 236 (766). The last
case discusses the relation of various problems of debt collection to convenience of trade between England
and Maryland.
... Genay v. Norris, I Bay 6 (S. C. 1784); Porter v. Dunn, id. at 53 (1786 or 1787).
""I1t is extremely difficult to find statistical analyses of early trade, because not enough statistics
were kept. The first important contemporary statistical study of trade is TENCH CoxE, A VIaw oF THE
UITED STATES (794). Coxe was Commissioner of Revenue. However, most of his data begins about
1790, and he has more data on exports and imports than interstate trade. A statistical reconstruction
has been done in the Carnegie Institution publication by EMORY R. JOHNSON and others, HISoRY oF
DomETIc AND FoREIGN COMMERCE OF TE UNITa STATES (x915). The materials vol. 1, 112-12i and 162-
174, and particularly the analysis at 171, with tables, present the best picture of trade. Other significant
studies are ThisonHy PrrxiN, A STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE COMitERCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1835);
and two Columbia University studies, ROBET A. EAsT, BusiNEss ENTERPRISE SN THE AmERICwA Rvo-
LuTzoNARY ERA (938), and MICHAEL KRAUS, INTERCOLONIAL Aspc-rs OF AMERICAN CULTURE ON THE
EvE OF THE RvOLUTION (1928). The German pamphlet, SHiRACH, HISTORISCH-STATISTICHE NOnZ
nER GRossBtsrrANiscHEN COLONIEN I AmERIKA (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1776), has the advantage of
contemporaneity although its author had not been in the Colonies.
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local variety. Thus New York was the harbor for New Jersey and Connecticut, and
Philadelphia shipped the produce of Delaware. 2 The national business enterprise
of the sort that now utilizes diversity jurisdiction did not exist. In 178o the colonies
had no banks, and, as Tables i and 2 show, the insurance business had scarcely
begun to affect litigation.12-  Though land speculation was large business, its days
of big litigation were largely in the offing. Third, interstate transactions were prin-
cipally on a barter, paper-money; or very short-term basis. There was credit in the
colonies both before and after the Revolution, but it was credit from England1 24
Thus the actualities of trade coupled with the record of litigation combine to give
this description: There was very little commercial diversity litigation among the
colonies prior to 1787. What there was arose largely within confined marketing
districts in which economic lines deviated slightly from state lines. National com-
mercial litigation involving far-flung interests was around the corner after the Revo-
lution. The cotton gin and the first cotton mill, large-scale banking and large-scale
insurance were still in the future in 1787. There was some, but only a little, pre-
Revolutionary hostility in litigation to the commercial interests of other states, but
this may well have been because the occasion for hostility rarely arose. The typical
case was still A v. B for a cow.
To this point, the subject of diversity has been approached as though there were
a rational distinction between anti-British-creditor hostility and interstate hostilities.
'2
2 This is not to say that mere was no long-distance intercolonial trade. Boston and Newport
merchants traded all over the cdast, JOHNsON, supra note 121, at 17o; and products such as paper and
books went from Philadelphia to the South. See Hanna, The Trade of the Delaware District Before the
Revolution, 2 SMITH COLL. STUDIEs ix His-r. 241-245 (1916-17), for a statement of the nature of
trade districts, and id. at 261 et seq. on trade from Philadelphia to the South. But Hanna concludes
that the West Indian trade was "tbe basis of the commercial life of this district."
Some colonies had a higher proportion of intercolonial trade than others because they were in
marketing districts pivoting on neighboring cities. New Hampshire, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Delaware are examples. JoHNsoN, op. cit. supra, note 121, at 168. It will be noted from Table 3
that Connecticut had an unusually large proportion of diversity cases, analyzed by Friendly, supra note
so6, at 493, 494- It is doubtless no accident that the one concrete example Madison gave the Virginia
convention of the necessity of diversity jurisdiction was that "before the war, New York was to a great
amount a creditor of Connecticut. While it depended on the laws and regulations of Connecticut, she
might withhold payment. If I be not misinformed, there were reasons to complain." 3 ELLxOrr 535
(italics added).
"a The Bank of North America, a Morris enterprise but with national participation, was founded in
1781. The Bank of New York and the Massachusetts Bank followed in 1784. A second series of
banks began shortly after the adoption of the Constitution. For discussion see EAST, op. cit. supra note
1i, c. XIII, Commercial Banks, 1781-92. Small insurance offices began in New York and Philadelphia
aboiut 176o and began to achieve importance during the war; id. at 69-71. By 1834, there were 503
banks with a capital of $203,000,000; PsTKaN, op. cit. supra, note 121, at 460.
"'. Colonial credit and investment practices showing that credits were scattered but not unknown
are described in EAST, op. cit. supra, note 121, at 15-23. But as Franklin said in his Address on a
Commercial System, May 11, 1787, "In this country the consumer's money follows the delivery of the
manufacture, therefore less capital is required." CoxE, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 19. He also refers
to European credit, speaking of "the prodigious credit there given to our merchants on the return of
peace." Id. at 26, 27. As JOHNsON, op. Cit. supra, note 121, at 126, puts it, ". . . American commerce,
not only in colonial times but after the Revolution, was carried on very largely by the aid of British
capital. There was a scarcity of capital in America, and merchants in the United States traded with
British merchants whose supply of capital enabled them to extend the necessary credit to American
traders after, as well as before, 1783."
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For the post-1763 period of strain between the colonies and England, this distinction
is sensible; but in earlier periods there was no anti-British-creditor sentiment which
could not just as well have been anti-Philadelphia-banker sentiment had there been
Philadelphia banks. The Philadelphia Convention dealt with both together by
providing federal jurisdiction both for the extra-state suitors and the extra-national
suitors. Madison said in the Virginia convention, speaking of local courts, "We
well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done them in these courts, and this
has prevented pmany wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us." 125
He and his colleagues obviously thought of national and international diversity to-
gether.
The real key to the diversity clause lies in the optimism of the founders, an
optimism which escapes the label "fantastic" because the dreams so often came true.
The members of the Convention did a great deal of anticipating, and on many sub-
jects besides diversity jurisdiction. They anticipated manufacture and trade within
the United States on an unknown but vast scale. One of the principal objects of the
Convention was to open a path for that expansion.' 6 If Robert Morris could buy
five million acres of New York, he could anticipate gigantic interstate trade. If
the Founding Fathers could anticipate the industrial and commercial revolution,
already beginning, they could anticipate some of the obstacles to the success of the
concomitant business enterprise. The diversity clauses were based on that dual antic-
ipation more largely than on experience. Actual experience in quantity was lacking
because the economic order necessary to that experience had not yet come fully into
existence.
At the same time there was an independent but related factor of judgment that
the federal courts would be more sympathetic to business interests than the state
courts. There was probably a sentiment that land investments would be safest in
the hands of federal judges. It is unnecessary to restate here the materials covered by
Friendly. Suffice it to say that independent reexamination of the subject results in
the conviction that one heavy factor in establishing diversity jurisdiction was the
consideration of the comparative class bias of the two systems.
There was probably a third factor of efficiency. Poorly paid, short-term state
judges were, in the minds of the Philadelphia Convention, sometimes incompetent
and inept.27
125 3 EL-or 583.
'"In studying the Constitution it should never be forgotten that its first object was to promote
commerce. The delegates originally gathered at Annapolis were directed "to take into consideration
the trade and commerce of the United States; to consider how far a uniform system in their com-
mercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent har-
mony." i EsLuovr 117.
""5 Madison speaks of the "tardy, and even defective, administration of justice . . . in some states."
3 ELMOrT 533. The foregoing discussion in this article shows that on occasion the state courts were not
efficient. Irritated counsel in Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344, 350 (U. S. 1797), said, "If, disdaining
to sanctify the errors of clerks, and the blunders of yearlings (to whom too often the business of
keeping and making up a record is confided) the Federal Courts should discountenance and reject the
errors and irregularities of the practice of the State Courts, every suitor would gratefully acknowledge
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To summarize, the diversity jurisdiction in the federal Constitution may fairly be
said to be the product of three factors, the relative weights of which cannot ndw be
assessed:
i. The desire to avoid regional prejudice against commercial litigants, based in
small part on experience and in large part on common-sense anticipation.
2. The desire to permit commercial, manufacturing, and speculative interests to
litigate their controversies, and particularly their controversies with other classes,
before judges who would be firmly tied to their own interests.1 28
3. The desire to achieve more efficient administration of justice for the classes
thus benefited.
IV
CONCLUSION
In the history of federal jurisdiction and federal courts, many questions remain
unanswered: If Madison and Wilson had not devised their "Great Compromise" at
Philadelphia, would we today be without lower federal courts? If it had not been
for the necessity of settling international admiralty disputes, would either the Con-
vention or the Congress of 1789 have created a federal lower court system? In other
words, is the domestic federal legal system predominantly a byproduct of our in-
ternational relations? Why-a mystery truly dark-why did the Congress of 1789
provide that appellate jurisdiction should be sufficient in federal question cases while
there should be trial court jurisdiction in diversity cases? Why diversity at all?
What is the relationship of particular economic interests to Article III? But enough
of such a list; there is sufficient mystery left in the origins of the federal judiciary
to keep a good many researchers busy for a long time.
the obligation." In s8os Hamilton, reviewing all the reasons for establishment of a federal judiciary,
spoke of state courts "so constituted as not to afford sufficient assurance of a pure, enlightened, and
independent administration of justice." 7 HAI Lrorx, WORKs OF HAMILTOX 764 (185x). (The phrase is
of course ambiguous and was written in a new controversy, but the whole essay of which it is a part
coincides to a considerable extent with Madison's clause-by-clause analysis, 3 ELLiTarr 531-534.)
1.8 The spirit desired is well indicated in the instructions of Justice Patterson to a jury while on
circuit in Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 310, 3ri (U. S. 1795). The right of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property is spoken of affectionately as natural and inalienable. Indeed, said
Justice Patterson, "It is sacred." As a critic of the judiciary system put it, "The few, the well born, &e,
as Mr. Adams calls them, in judicial decisions as well as in legislation, are generally disposed, and very
naturally too, to favour those of their own description." Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer, in PAUL L.
FoRo, P~iassLETs o-. TaE Co-srrTurrsoe 316 (z888).
